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ABA MINIMUM STANDARDS
Conclusion
Due to the "slippery"' " nature of the right to a speedy trial
and the ad hoc balancing test used to determine whether the
right has been denied, it is doubtful that a statutory scheme
could master its nuances. The ABA Standards offer guidelines
in protecting both the defendant's and society's interests, but
even a strict adherence to the standards would not likely solve
all potential problems in this area. Although the Louisiana
supreme court has recognized that the constitutional right can-
not be infringed by legislative enactments, such enactments "do
serve to establish legislative recognition of the time that body
has in all probability found to be reasonable delays for prosecu-
tions. '64 It is therefore unlikely that Louisiana courts will find
a denial of the constitutional right where the time limitations
have not expired. Gladden and Montgomery emphasize the word-
ing of code provisions at the expense of the right which the
time limitations attempt to protect. Although no statutory for-
mula, however precise, could fully and fairly implement the
right to a speedy trial in all cases, the writer submits that judicial
reflection on the underlying considerations could serve to mini-
mize anomalous results in the application of procedural rules.
Mark Gilbert Murov
PROBATION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF
LOUISIANA LAW AND THE ABA STANDARDS
Probation, the most frequently employed form of correc-
tional treatment,' was first used as an ameliorative device to
soften the edges of a rigid, punitive system.2 While the punish-
ment of crime was once considered to serve a prophylactic
purpose3 in itself, the focus today centers on the treatment and
rehabilitation of offenders and the correction and prevention
of factors which bring about criminal behavior.4 Probation
63. Barker v. Wingo, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 2188 (1972).
64. State v. Gladden, 260 La. 735, 744, 257 So.2d 388, 391 (1972).
1. Cohen, Sentencing, Probation, and the Rehabilitative Ideal: The View
from Mempa v. Rhay, 47 TEx. L. REV. 1, 26 (1968).
2. Id.
3. Andenaes, General Prevention-Illusion or Reality?, 43 J. CGRM. L.C.
& P.S. 176 (1952).
4. Bassett, Discretionary Power and Procedural Right in the Granting
and Revoking of Probation, 60 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 479 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as Bassett].
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stands as both an example and an instrument of this new
emphasis."
Reliance on probation is linked to the popularity of the
broader concept of community-based treatment;" it assumes that
rehabilitation in the community is possible.7 This community-
based treatment permits the defendant to remold his life within
the framework of normal living conditions. It preserves his
family life and other social relationships and offers a more
individualized approach than a penal institution can provide.S
As an affirmative correctional tool, probation is used not only
because of its maximum benefit to the defendant, but also
because of its maximum benefit to the societyY Even though
evidence indicates the superiority of community treatment over
confinement, only 14.4% of correctional costs are for proba-
tion services nationally, with approximately 80% expended on
institutions.1 A cost comparison shows that probation super-
vision costs approximately $100 per person per year in Louisiana
compared with $1,000 for incarceration." Thus, the increased
reliance on probation is also linked to economic matters.
In consideration of the growing importance of the role
probation plays in the correctional process, the American Bar
Association has established certain Standards to guide each
state in developing an effective probation program.12 The
Standards Relating to Probation complement the Standards Re-
lating to Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures, and together
they are designed to promote a greater flexibility in sentencing
as a means to accomplish the purposes of rehabilitation and
5. Id.
6. Cohen, Sentencing, Probation, and the Rehabilitative Ideal: The View
from Mempa v. Rhay, 47 TEX. L. REv. 1 (1968). See also Dawkins, Probation
or Prison? Youth or Adultf, 30 F.R.D. 185, 277 (1961).
7. Dawkins, Probation or Prison? Youth or Adultf, 30 F.R.D. 185, 277
(1961).
8. ld.
9. ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS
RELATING TO PROBATION 1 (approved draft '1970) [hereinafter cited as ABA
STANDARDS, PROBATION].
10. PRESIDENT'S CRIME COMMISSION ON CORRECTIONS app. A (1961). In Lou-
isiana, only 11% of the corrections budget is for probation and parole.
LOUISIANA COMM. ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF CRIM. JUSTICE, LOUISIANA
ADULT CORRECTIONS-NEW DIRECTIONS 45 (1969) (hereinafter cited as NEw
DIRECTIONS].
11. NEw DIRECTIONS 48. In Louisiana, the cost of probation and parole
is $146 per person per year compared with $985.69 per year for maintenance
in the Louisiana State Penitentiary. Id.
12. A.BA STANDARDS, PROBATION §§ 1.1-6.6.
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to decrease the costs of correction. In most areas of probation
Louisiana complies with the ABA Standards. The purpose of
this Comment is to determine the areas in which Louisiana
probation law does not comply substantially with the Standards
and to examine the underlying reasons for the Standards in
order to determine the feasibility of future changes in those
areas in Louisiana.
Probation Without Supervision
In stating the general principles of probation the Standards
recommend: "Upon a sentence to probation, the court should
not be required to attach a condition of supervision by the pro-
bation department if in its judgment supervision is not appro-
priate for the particular case."'1 4 Louisiana, however, requires
supervision in all felony cases. 15 In Louisiana the terms "pro-
13. Erickson, The Standards of Criminal Justice in a Nutshell, 32 LA. L.
Rav. 369, 396 (1972).
14. ABA STANDARDS, PROBATION § 1.1 (C).
15. IA. CODI CRIM. P. art. 893 provides: "When it appears that the best
interest of the public and of the defendant will be served, the court, after
conviction of a felony for which the punishment is with or without hard
labor or a felony which is a violation of the Controlled Dangerous Sub-
stances Law of Louisiana, or a non-capital felony, may suspend for the
first conviction only the imposition or execution of any sentence, where
suspension is allowed under the law and in either case place the defendant
on probation under the supervision of the division of probation and parole
supervision. The period of probation shall be specified and shall not be
less than one year nor more than five years. The suspended sentence shall
be regarded as a sentence for the purpose of granting or denying a new
trial or appeal.
"The court under the same conditions and by the same procedure as
provided for above may suspend the execution or imposition of the sentence
of a multiple offender and place the defendant on probation if he intends
to participate in the program authorized by the Federal Narcotic Reha-
bilitation Act or other federal or state rehabilitation programs, however,
if for any reason the defendant is rejected by said program he shall be
returned to the custody of the court which imposed the sentence and the
sentencing judge shall order the sentence be executed. Rejection by said
program shall be a violation of the defendant's suspended sentence.
"If the sentence consists of both a fine and imprisonment, the court
may impose the fine, and suspend the sentence or place the defendant on
probation as to the imprisonment.
"The court shall not suspend a felony sentence after the defendant has
begun to serve the sentence.
"When the imposition of sentence has been suspended by the court,
as authorized by this article, and the court finds at the conclusion of the
probationary period that the probation of the defendant has been satis-
factory, the court may set the conviction aside and dismiss the prosecu-
tion and the dismissal of the prosecution shall have the same effect as
acquittal, except that said conviction may be considered as a first offense
and provide the basis for subsequent prosecution of the party as a multiple
offender, and further shall be considered as a first offense for the purposes
of any other law or laws relating to cumulation of offenses."
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bation" and "supervision" are treated as being synonymous while
the term "suspended sentence" is used as the basis of probation
which does not require supervision.16 The ABA Advisory Com-
mittee feels that the requirement of superivision is unwise and
that the courts should be free to attach supervision only as
the facts of each case indicate. 7
Intensive supervision is generally believed to be more effec-
tive than occasional contacts between the probation officer and
the probationer. 8 However, studies in this area indicate the
opposite is true. Although the following summary of a research
study concerns parole, it is equally applicable to probation:
"In order to evaluate the effects of a special selection and
training program of parole officers on recidivism reduction
of male delinquents, two control groups of 157 . . . and
152 . ..parolees, all of whom were supervised by regular
parole officers, were compared with 95 Experimental Group
parolees, who were supervised by 12 specially trained coun-
selors. The three groups were initially matched for back-
ground and offense variables. However, when comparison
was made for delinquent acts committed during the six-
month post parole period, of this study, no significant differ-
ences were found in the percentage or type of recidivism
among the groups."19
In another study conducted by the San Diego Municipal Court,
it was found that probation of chronic alcoholics with super-
vision by Alcoholics Anonymous, or probation with clinic super-
vision, produced no better results than no treatment at all.20
These studies do not indicate that probation is a failure,
but rather that probation (with supervision) is not being used
16. In Louisiana, probation is generally defined as "the supervision of
the offender in the community subject to the authority of the courts."
NEw DIRECTIONs 40. The ABA defines probation as "a sentence not involving
confinement which imposes conditions and retains authority in the sen-
tencing court to modify the conditions of the sentence or to resentence the
offender if he violates the conditions." ABA STANDARDS, PROBATION § 1.1(b).
17. ABA STANDARDS, PROBATION 25, 26.
18. Schwitzgebel & Baer, Intensive 8upervision by Parole Officers as a
Factor in Recidivism Reduction of Male Delinquents, 67 AM. J. PSYCHOLOGY
75 (1967).
19. Id. at 90.
20. Ditman, Crawford, Forgy, Moskowitz & Maclendon, A Controlled
Experiment on the Use of Probation for Drunk Arrests, 124 AM. J. Psy-
CHIATRY 2 (1967).
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properly.2 1 In some cases a fine or suspended sentence would
be more effective;22 therefore, research is still necessary to deter-
mine in which cases supervised probation would be of value.
On the question of suspended sentence without probation,
one author has stated:
"More frequent use of suspension of sentence without proba-
tion, like the fine, is part of the answer to the prison prob-
lem. The national average use of probation is probably about
one-third of felony convictions. Many of our informed stu-
dents of crime tell us it can safely be two-thirds, and that
public security would not be damaged with that percentage
of usage.
"We achieve success even now with many probationers
who receive little or no actual help or guidance from their
overworked probation officers. Can we not assume that these
offenders would have been equally successful if they had
received suspended sentences, without probation? When we
speak of trying to achieve greatly increased use of proba-
tion, we are really referring to both probation and suspended
sentence."
23
As these studies indicate, even probation should be used selec-
tively since outright discharge, fines, and suspended sentences
are often more appropriate.24 There is a need for Louisiana to
broaden the choice of sentencing alternatives and in that way
individualize the correctional process to insure that the goal
of rehabilitation is accomplished.
Criteria for Granting Probation
Recognizing the growing use and importance of probation,
21. Rubin, Illusions of Treatment in Sentences and Civil Commitments,
16 CRIM. & DEL. 79, 91 (1970) [hereinafter cited as RUBIN].
22. Id.
23. Laws, Criminal Courts and Adult Probation, 3 N.P.P.A.J. 354, 358
(1957). Louisiana's work load of probation and parole is so large that very
little supervision, counseling or treatment is possible. In 1969, there were
4,611 probation cases supervised by 53 probation and parole officers. "These
officers also supervised 2,129 parolees, a total of 6,740 'cases' or an average
of 162 per officer." NEW DIRnECTIONS 41.
24. Rubin, 92.
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the Standards set out a declaration of policy25 and certain criteria
to apply for granting probation." No comparable declaration
exists in Louisiana. The criterion for granting probation in
Louisiana for felony cases provided by the Louisiana Code of
Criminal Procedure is "where it appears that the best interest
of the public and of the defendant will be served . . . ."- In
misdemeanor cases the court may, in its discretion, suspend
the execution of the whole or part of the sentence imposed.28
Although Louisiana has long recognized the soundness of
the rehabilitation approach by enacting statutes creating pro-
bation,2 9 there is a further need to establish more specific criteria
instead of leaving trial courts with such broad discretionary
power. The basic premise should be (as the Standards reflect)
that the automatic response in a sentencing situation should
be probation, unless specific aggravating factors emerge in the
particular case.'*
The lack of specific guidelines in the-probation area is mainly
25. ABA STANDARDS, PROBATION § 1.2 provides: "Probation is a desirable
disposition in appropriate cases because: (1) it maximizes the liberty of
the individual while t the same time vindicating the authority of the
law and effectively protecting the public from further violations of law;
(ii) it affirmatively promotes the rehabilitation of the offender by continu-
ing normal community contacts; (iii) it avoids the negative and frequently
stultifying effects of confinement which often severely and unnecessarily
complicate the reintergration of the offender into the community; (iv) it
greatly reduces the financial costs to the public treasury of an effective
correctional system; (v) it minimizes the impact of the conviction upon
innocent dependents of the offender."
26. ABA STANDARDS, PROsATION § 1.3: "Criteria for granting probation.
(a) the probation decision should not turn upon generalizations about types
of offenses or the existence of a prior criminal record, but should be rooted
in the facts and circumstances of each case. The court should consider
the nature and circumstances of the crime, the history and character of
the offender, and available institutional and community resources. Proba-
tion should be the sentence unless the sentencing court finds that: (i) con-
finement is necessary to protect the public from further criminal activity
by the offender; or (ii) the offender is in need of correctional treatment
which can most effectively be provided if he is confined; or (iii) it would
unduly depreciate the seriousness of the offense if a sentence of probation
were imposed. (b) Whether the defendant pleads guilty, pleads not guilty
or intends to appeal is not relevant to the issue of whether probation is an
appropriate sentence."
27. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 893.
28. Id. art. 894.
29. Suspension of sentence has been provided for in Louisiana since
1914 (La. Acts 1914, No. 74 §§ 1, 5) and was incorporated into the article
893 of the 1928 Code of Criminal Procedure. The first comprehensive system
of suspended sentence and probation was enacted in 1942. (La. Acts 1942,
No. 49 § 1).
30. ABA STANDARDS, PROBATION § 1.3.
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the result of probation's lack of constitutionally protected status.
The theory was that probation was a legislative grace or priv-
ilege and not a constitutionally protected right. This right-
privilege distinction in probation cases was first established by
the United States Supreme Court in Escoe v. Zerbst.31 Other
theories are that by accepting probation the probationer enters
into a contract with the state and thereby waives his due
process rights,32 and that probation is not different from im-
prisonment because the probationer remains within the protec-
tive custody of the court.33 However, the Supreme Court has
rejected the concept that due process rights turn upon whether
a right or privilege is involved 34 and in Morrissey v. Brewer
indicated that whether "any procedural protections are due
depends on the extent to which an individual will be 'condemned
to suffer grievous loss.' "
In other jurisdictions, some courts have indicated that pro-
bation may not be denied arbitrarily or in contradiction of the
pre-sentence report.36 For example, in a California case 7 the
defendant had waited in the car while her companion killed a
man in a robbery. She pleaded guilty and received a sentence
of life imprisonment. The judge had indicated in advance of the
the sentence hearing that he would not consider probation. The
case was reversed by the state supreme court on the grounds
that the California statute requires that consideration be given
to the pre-sentence report and the desirability of probation. The
court held that a judge may not confine a defendant, even on a
murder charge, without considering probation as a possible dis-
position.
The attitude of the law seems to have changed greatly since
31. 295 U.S. 490 (1935).
32. Fuller v. State, 122 Ala. 32, 26 So. 146 (1899); Johnson v. Walls, 155
Ga. 177, 194 S.E. 380 (1937). See Weihofen, Revoking Probation, Parole or
Pardon Without a Hearing, 32 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 531 (1942).
33. See Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1962); McCoy v. Harris, 108
Utah 407, 160 P.2d 721 (1945).
34. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254 (1970).
35. 92 S. Ct. 2593, 2600 (1972). See also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970).
36. People v. Walker, 5 Cal. Rptr. 283 (1960); People v. Cooper, 123 Cal.
App. 2d 353, 266 P.2d 566 (1954); People v. Stover, 317 Ill. 191, 198 N.E. 67
(1925); State v. Ivan, 33 N.J. 197, 162 A.2d 851 (1960); People v. Silver, 10
App. Div. 2d 274, 199 N.Y.S.2d 254 (1960).
37. People v. Wade, 53 Cal. 2d 322, 348 P.2d 116, 1 Cal. Rptr. 683 (1959).
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the right-privilege distinction made in Escoe v. Zerbst.8 Perhaps
under the "grevious loss" 9 test, courts should be compelled to
consider probation in every case.
Pre-sentence Report
In order to properly implement the criteria for granting
probation,4 it is necessary prior to sentencing for the court to
have adequate information about the offender, the crime, and
the resources in correctional facilities and elsewhere in the
community.41 With rehabilitation as the dominant concern, the
court is expected to select the sentence which best fits the
individual defendant within the sentencing alternatives avail-
able.42 Yet, the contact between the sentencing judge and the
defendant in federal courts has been limited to matters brought
out in the trial if, in fact, there was a trial.4 The pre-sentence
report is the vehicle generally used to relay needed information
to the court before an appropriate sentence can be imposed.44
It ranges well beyond matters that normally arise at the trial
and is concerned with defendant's character, his history and
environment, and his adjustment to them.4" The pre-sentence
report and its influence on the sentencing process epitomize the
fact that the humanitarian's plea-let the punishment fit the
criminal and not merely the crime-has come to be an accepted
postulate of correctional policy. 46
The Standards recommend that the pre-sentence report be
made available in all criminal cases to assist the judge in
making an intelligent decision.47 Under Louisiana law the sen-
38. 295 U.S. 490 (1935).
39. Morrissey v. Brewer, 92 S. Ct. 2593 (1972).
40. See note 26 supra.
41. ABA STANDARDS, PROBATION 32.
42. Guzman, Defendant's Access to Presentence Reports in Federal
Criminal Courts, 52 IOWA L. REv. 161 (1966).
43. Id. at 162.
44. Id.
45. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 875 provides in part: "In making the investiga-
tion, the probation officer shall inquire into the circumstances attending the
commission of the offense, the defendant's history of delinquency or crim-
inality, his family situation and background, economic and employment
status, education, personal habits, and other matters deemed relevant by
the officer, or ordered investigated by the court."
46. See Allen, Criminal Justice, Legal Values and the Rehabilitative
Ideal, 50 J. Chum. L.C. & P.S. 226 (1959).
47. ABA STANDARDS, PROBATION § 2.1: "Availability and use: (a) All courts
trying criminal cases should be supplied with the resources and supporting
[Vol. 33
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tencing judge is authorized to order a pre-sentence report in all
cases other than "capital offenses."48 If the pre-sentence report
is not ordered, a post-sentence report is mandatory where a
sentence of one year or more is imposed.49 Louisiana has adopted
the philosophy that "the pre-sentence investigation is the most
reliable and scientific device available for sound sentencing," °
but, the requirement of making only the post-sentence report
mandatory hinders the sentencing process. Indeed, the value of
the pre-sentence report continues beyond imposition of the
sentence. Although the pre-sentence report was originally ad-
vanced as an indispensable element in enlightened sentencing,
its application has demonstrated a potential for other use within
the criminal justice system.51 For example, if the defendant is
placed on probation, the probation officer is supplied with the
report; if the defendant is committed to some institution, that
institution may use the report in order to plan the defendant's
rehabilitation. 2 The post-sentence report achieves this purpose
but fails to provide an intelligent basis for the most crucial aspect
of the judicial process, sentencing. 53 Most authorities agree that
the pre-sentence report is the heart of sentencing and probation.5 4
staff to permit a presentence investigation and a written report of its
results in every case. (b) The court should explicitly be authorized by
statute to call for such an investigation and report in every case. The
statute should also provide that such an investigation and report should be
made In every case where incarceration for one year or more is a possible
disposition, where the defendant is less than (21) years old, or where the
defendant is a first offender, unless the court specifically orders to the
contrary in a particular case." See also, CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELAT-
ING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURE § 4.1 (approved draft 1968)
[hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS, SENTENCING].
48. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 875, states in part: "If a defendant is con-
victed of an offense other than a capital offense, the court may order the
division of probation and parole supervision to make a pre-sentence inves-
tigation and report within sixty days from the date of the conviction....
The court may postpone imposition of sentence until the report is received.
"Local and state law enforcement agencies and mental and correctional
institutions shall furnish to the probation officer criminal records and such
other information and data as the probation officer requests. The court may
order a physical and mental examination of the defendant.
"If the defendant is sentenced to imprisonment, a copy of the report
shall be transmitted by the division of probation and parole supervision to
the institution to which he is committed."
49. Id. art. 876.
50. LA. DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, REPORT OP PAROLES REHABILITATION COMMITTEE
153 (Jan. 1960).
51. Note, 58 GA. L.J. 451 (1970).
52. LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 875-77.
53. Higgins, Confidentiality of Present ene Reports, 28 ALBANY L. REv.
12 (1964).
54. Moreland, Model Penal Code: Sentencing, Probation, and Parole, 57
KY. L.J. 51, 72 (1968).
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It would seem that the goals of criminal justice may best be
served in Louisiana by making greater use of the pre-sentence
report, rather that the post-sentence report.
Although the Standards suggest employment of the pre-
sentence report in every case, it is not suggested that it be man-
datory in every case.1B The legislature must face the question
of whether it is sound policy to require the use of the report
in any particular class of cases.6 The Model Penal Code"' has
suggested that the pre-sentence report be authorized in every
case and mandatory in all felony cases, in all cases when the
defendant is less that twenty-two years old, and in all cases
where an extended term can be imposed.55 The Standards are
in accord with the Penal Code and also add the instance where
the defendant is a first offender.59 However, as subsection b of
Sentencing Standard 4.1 indicates, the court should have discre-
tion not to obtain a report if there are affirmative reasons which
would make it unadvisable.0
The importance of a full and accurate pre-sentence report
cannot be overstated. In the majority of criminal cases the
accused is convicted,"' but ordinarily his conviction follows from
his own guilty plea rather than a trial.0 2 Hence, in most cases
the major question is not guilt or innocence but the appropriate
sentence. Intelligent, informed sentencing is frustrated when the
judge's determination is based on an erroneous report. There
is a need to balance the requirements of availability of sources
of information to the court and fairness to the defendant. A
sentencing process based on confidential sources of information
serves no useful purpose if the information is wrong. The policy
against delay and disclosure prevents counsel from showing that
55. A3A STANDARDS, PROBATION § 2.1.
56. At present, the pre-sentence report is not required in any case, but
the post-sentence report is required in felony cases where a pre-sentence
report has not been made. LA. CODE CRM. P. arts. 875, 876.
57. MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.007 (1) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954).
58. Id.
59. ABA STANDARDS, PROBATION § 2.1; ABA STANDARDS, SENTENCINQ § 4.1.
60. Id.
61. Discovery in Federal Criminal Cases, A Symposium at the Judioial
Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit -Pesentence Investigation
Reports: Confidentiality or Disclosure, 33 F.R.D. 47, 122-28 (1963) [here-
inafter cited as Federal Symposium on Discovery].
62. Id.
[Vol. 33
1973] ABA MINIMUM STANDARDS
a mistake has been made.68 To avoid such an injustice the
Standards recommend requiring the court to disclose to the
defendant the information adversely affecting him which is con-
tained in the pre-sentence report.64
Under the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure, disclosure
of information contained in the pre-sentence report to the
defendant is discretionary. 5 There is no requirement that the
judge state in the record the basis of his determination, nor is
appellate review of sentencing available.6 6 Thus, this crucial
stage of the criminal process is without effective procedural safe-
guards.
The question of disclosure of the pre-sentence report to the
parties has produced a heated controversy for over twenty
years.67 Principal arguments raised against disclosure focus on
63. Higgins, Confldenta~lty of Presentence Reports, 28 ALBANY L. REV.
12 (1964).
64. ABA STANDARDS, PROBATION § 2.5. See ABA STANDARDS, SENTENCING
§ 4.4. "Presentence report: disclosure; parties.
"(a) Fundamental fairness to the defendant requires that the substance
of all derogatory information which adversely affects his interests and
which has not otherwise been disclosed in open court should be called to
the attention of the defendant, his attorney, and others who are acting on
his behalf.
"(b) This principle should be implemented by requiring that the sen-
tencing court permit the defendant's attorney or the defendant himself
if he has no attorney, to inspect the report. The prosecution should also
be shown the report if it is shown to the defense. In extraordinary cases
the court should be permitted to except from disclosure parts of the report
which are not relevant to a proper sentence, diagnostic opinion which might
seriously disrupt a program of rehabilitation, or sources of information
which have been obtained on a promise of confidentiality. In all cases, where
parts of the report are not disclosed under such authority, the court should
be required to state for the record the reasons for its action and to inform
the defendant and his attorney that information has not been disclosed.
The action of the court in excepting information from disclosure should
be subject to appellate review."
65. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 877 states: "The pre-sentence or post-sentence
investigation report shall be privileged and shall not be disclosed directly
or indirectly to anyone other than the sentencing court, members of the
division of probation and parole supervision, the officer in charge of the
institution to which the defendant is committed, the parole board, the
probation or the parole officer if the defendant is placed on probation or
released on parole, medical authorities if the defendant is committed to a
hospital, the pardon board, and the governor or his representative.
"Before imposing sentence the court may advise the defendant or his
counsel of the factual contents and conclusions or any pre-sentence inves-
tigation report. The sources of confidential information shall not, however,
be disclosed."
66. Comment, 33 IA. I Rsv. 559 (1973).
67. Lorensen, The Disclosure to Defense of Presentence Reports in West
Virginia, 69 W. VA. L. Rsv. 159 (1967); Roche, The Position. for Conftden-
tiality of the Presentence Investigation Report, 29 ALBANY L. REv. 206 (1965);
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loss of information and harm to the defendant.68 First, there is
the fear that disclosure would dry up sources of information.
It is pointed out that social agencies, families, employees and
other informants would be extremely relucant to provide the
necessary information which would materially affect the efficacy
of the report.0 9 Another objection is that disclosure would cause
a tremendous delay in the sentencing process by allowing the
defendant opportunity to take exception to data contained in the
report.7 0 The fear is that the defendant, already having been
found guilty, will have nothing to lose by denying every
unfavorable aspect of the report.7 1 Finally, there is the argu-
ment that there are certain kinds of information that would be
affirmatively harmful to the rehabilitation efforts of the
defendant.72 A cold objective evaluation by a wife, probation
officer, or psychiatrist, might cause great resentment and a harm-
ful reaction within the defendant. The difficulty with these con-
tentions is that each is aimed at a specific evil which may be
legitimate cause for concern, but does not support a general
denial of disclosure in all cases.73
The basic argument in favor of disclosure is simply that
it is fundamentally unfair to sentence a man on the basis of
information he has had no opportunity to correct or comment
Guzman, Defendant's Access to Presentence Reports in Federal Criminal
Courts, 52 IowA L. REv. 161 (1966); Higgins, In Response to Roche, 29 ALBANY
L. REV. 225 (1965); Higgins, Confidentiality of Presentence Reports, 28 ALBANY
L. Rov. 12 (1964); Hincks, In Opposition to Rule 34(c)(2), Proposed Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, 8 FED. PROB. J. 3 (Oct.-Dec. 1944); Note, 49
COLUM. L. Rev. 567 (1949).
68. See, e.g., Parsons, The Presentence Investigation Must Be Preserved
as a Confidential Document, 28 FeD. PROB. J. 3 (Mar. 1964).
69. Lorensen, The Disclosure to Defense of Presentence Reports in West
Virginia, 69 W. VA. L. REV. 159 (1967). See Higgins, Confidentiality of Pre-
sentence Reports, 28 ALBANY L. Rev. 12 (1964).
70. Hincks, In Opposition to Rule 34(c)(2), Proposed Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, 8 FED. PROS. J. 3 (Oct.-Dec. 1944).
71. Guzman, Defendant's Access to Presentence Reports in Federal Crim-
ital Courts, 52 IOWA L. REv. 161 (1966).
72. P. KEvE, THE PROBATION OFFICER INVESTIGATES (1960). This authority,
in putting forth the principal argument against disclosure writes: "But
if he reads a report that suddenly strips his personality naked, he will
deny the picture he is shown and reject the help that is accordingly
offered. This can be particularly true in those frequent cases where the
client's personality has some paranoid characteristics. When this sort of
client is confronted with analytical material about himself, he is likely
to receive It as reinforcement for his paranoid views, and so the process
contributes to his sickness, instead of his cure." Id. at 10.
73. ABA STANDARDS, SENTENCING 217-18.
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upon.7 4 The ABA recommendation takes into consideration the
major causes of concern espoused by the opponents of disclosure.
The Standards recommend mandatory disclosure of all informa-
tion contained in the pre-sentence reports with specified excep-
tions designed to protect sources of information and to pre-
vent an adverse effect on rehabilitation." Thus, the defendant
is provided with an adequate basis upon which to challenge the
authenticity of the report while the procedure is protected from
the possible evils of mandatory disclosure in all cases, under all
circumstances.
As for the argument that disclosure would unduly delay
the sentencing process, quite the opposite effect is indicated.
Several judges who follow the practice of disclosure have noted
that disclosure permits the scope of argument regarding sen-
tencing to be limited, thus permitting the discussion to be
directed to pertinent considerations." This "disadvantage" of
disclosure may be turned into an "advantage" since disclosure
seems to provoke responses, attitudes, opinions and suggestions
which are valuable to the court in arriving at a more sensitive
determination."
There is a strong argument that a sentence based on errone-
ous information is violative of due process.7 8 Although the
Supreme Court has never squarely faced the issue of whether
disclosure is required, writers and courts consistently cite
Williams v. New York7 9 as support that due process does not
require disclosure of the pre-sentence report.80 The court in
Williams held due process does not require that a defendant
have the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses who sup-
74. See generally Higgins, Conjdentiality of Presentence Reports, 28
ALBANY L. REv. 12 (1964); Note, 101 U. PA. L. Rgv. 257 (1952).
75. ABA STANDARDS, SENTENCING § 4.4.
76. See note 74 supra.
77. See note 74 supra. See also Lorensen, The Disclosure to Defense of
Presentence Reports in West Virginia, 69 W. VA. L. REv. 159 (1967).
78. Rubin, supra note 21, at 79.
79. 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
80. For judicial opinion interpreting Williams In this manner see Powers
v. United States, 325 F.2d 666 (1st Cir. 1963); United States v. Durham, 181
F. Supp. 503 (D.D.C. 1960); State v. Moore, 108 A.2d 675 (Del. Super. Cit.
1954); Morgan v. State, 142 So.2d 308 (Fla. App. 1962). Articles which cite
Williams for the above mentioned propositions Include: Chandler, Latter-
Day Procedures in the Sentencing and Treatment of Offenders in the Federal
Courts, 37 VA. L. REV. 825 (1951); Gauklin, Should Presentence Reports Be
Shoun to Defendants, 79 N.J.L.J. 421 (1956).
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plied information which the probation officer included in his
report. The issue of disclosure was not even mentioned in the
majority opinion.
A more pertinent United States Supreme Court decision is
Townsend v. Burke.8' This case strongly supports the position
that the purpose of counsel at the sentencing procedure is to
assure the accuracy of information to be used in framing the
sentence. Obviously this function of counsel cannot be accom-
plished without disclosure of the pre-sentence report and a
hearing in which erroneous information may be challenged.
Most authorities agree that there should be disclosure unless
there are compelling reasons against it.82 As previously shown,
even the strongest arguments against mandatory disclosure have
been taken into consideration in drawing up the Standards. Thus,
there appear to be no such compelling reasons to deny dis-
closure. Although the Louisiana law indicates an encourage-
ment of such disclosure, it is submitted that stronger provisions
are needed.
Revocation of Probation
The question of due process again arises in the area of
revocation of probation. A probationer's status can be revoked
only upon a breach of conditions of probation;8 it cannot be
revoked arbitrarily.8 4 This restriction against arbitrary action
has its basis in the due process clause. 5
The Standards provide grounds for, and alternatives to,
probation revocation, and guidelines for determining when revo-
cation should be followed by imprisonment.8 6 In Louisiana, pro-
81. 334 U.S. 736 (1948).
82. Higgins, In Responae to Roche, 29 ALBANY L. REv. 225, 228 (1965);
Federal Symposium on Discovery, supra note 61, at 122-28.
83. See, e.g., Manning v. United States, 161 F.2d 827 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 332 U.S. 792 (1947); Ex parte Maguth, 103 Cal. App. 57, 284 P. 940
(1930).
84. Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490 (1935); Burns v. United States, 287 U.S.
216 (1932).
85. See note 84 supra.
86. ABA STANDARDS, PROBATION § 5.1: "Grounds for an alternative to
probation revocation.
"(a) Violation of a condition is both a necessary and a sufficient ground
for the revocation of probation. Revocation followed by imprisonment should
not be the disposition, however, unless the court finds on the basis of the
original offense and the intervening conduct of the offender, that:
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bation may be revoked if the court finds that the defendant
has violated or is about to violate a condition of his probation.8
Under the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure, the proba-
tioner is given a hearing concerning the alleged violation,
and, if the court finds that the conditions have been or are about
to be violated, it may: (1) reprimand and warn the probationer;
(2) order that supervision be intensified; (3) add conditions to
the probation, or (4) order revocation of probation. 8 Revocation
is also appropriate when a probationer is convicted of another
felony, when he is on probation for a felony or any crime when
the sentence has been suspended, or when the defendant is on
probation for a misdemeanor.
The Standards recommend that the court should not revoke
probation without an open court proceeding where defendant
will be represented by counsel.8 9 They also provide that an
order revoking probation should be appealable after the offender
has been resentenced.90 In Louisiana, only an informal or sum-
mary hearing is required by the court.9 ' If the imposition of the
"(I) confinement is necessary to protect the public from further criminal
activity by the offender; or (ii) the offender is in need of correctional
treatment which can most effectively be provided if he is confined; or
(iii) it would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the violation if probation
were not revoked.
"(b) It would be appropriate for standards to be formulated as a guide
to probation departments and courts in processing the violation of condi-
tions. In any event, the following intermediate steps should be considered
in every case as possible alternatives to revocation:
"(I) a review of the conditions, followed by changes where necessary
or desirable; (ii) a formal or informal conference with the probationer to
reemphasize the necessity of compliance with the conditions; (iii) a formal
or informal warning that further violations could result in revocation."
87. LA. CODE CrIm. P. art. 900.
88. Id.
89. Id. art. 901.
90. ABA STANDARDS, PROBATION § 5.4: "Nature of revocation proceedings.
"(a) The court should not revoke probation without an open court
proceeding attended by the following incidents:
"(i) a prior written notice of the alleged violation;
"(ii) representation by retained or appointed counsel; and
"(iii) where the violation is contested, establishment of the violation by
the government by a preponderance of the evidence.
Sentence should be imposed following a revocation according to the same
procedures as are applicable to original sentencing proceedings.
"(b) The government is entitled to be represented by counsel in a con-
tested revocation proceeding.
"(c) As in the case of all other proceedings in open court, a record
of the revocation proceeding should be made and preserved In such a
manner that it can be transcribed as needed.
"(d) An order revoking probation should be appealable after the offender
has been resentenced."
91. LA. CODE Cnm .P. art. 900.
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sentence was suspended, the court will impose sentence at the
revocation hearing. The defendant has a right to counsel only
at revocation hearings where sentence is imposed 2 The only
available remedies for the defendant in appealing a revocation
of probation or suspended sentence are through habeas corpus
proceedings or supervisory jurisdiction of the Louisiana supreme
court.0 3
The United States Supreme Court, in Mempa v. Rhay,9 4
held that a defendant's sixth amendment rights had been violated
at "deferred sentencing hearings" where he was not afforded
the right to counsel. Louisiana has recognized this right9 5 but
should go one step further by affording the right to counsel
at revocation proceedings where no new sentence is imposed.
The majority of state courts have used the right-privilege
distinction not only to justify lack of counsel and other proce-
dural safeguards at revocation hearings but also to deny the
hearing itself.9 6 In the face of recent United States Supreme
Court cases, this distinction is no longer dispositive as to whether
due process is applicable.0 In Morrissey v. Brewer, s the Su-
preme Court held that certain due process protections must be
afforded at a parole revocation. In reaching this decision the
court reiterated that whether due process rights apply depends
upon whether the individual will be "condemned to suffer
grievous loss." The court found that such a loss would be sus-
tained when parole is revoked because the parolee's rights were
of such a nature as to include "many of the core values of
unqualified liberty . . . ."99 Thus the Court found that some
orderly process is required, "however informal."100 The process
outlined by the court included the following minimum protec-
92. State ex rel. Robinson v. Henderson, 257 La. 179, 241 So.2d 762 (1970).
93. State v. Haynes, 225 La. 52, 229 So.2d 697 (1969).
94. 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
95. State ex rel. Robinson v. Henderson, 257 La. 179, 241 So.2d 762 (1970).
96. See Sklar, Law and Practice In Probation and Parole Revocation
Hearings, 55 J. CM. L.C. & P.S. 175 (1964); Note, 24 VAND. L. REv. 163 (1970).
97. Morrissey v. Brewer, 92 S. Ct. 2593 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254 (1970) (welfare recipient case where Court weighed recipient's interest
in avoiding loss of status against the governmental interest in summary
adjudication); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (welfare payments
denied because of one-year residency requirement); Cafeteria Workers
Union v. McElry, 367 U.S. 886 (1961) (worker summarily barred from place
of work for security reasons).
98. 92 S. Ct. 2593 (1972).
99. Id. at 2601.
100. Id.
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tions: (1) written notice of the claimed parole violations; (2)
disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him; (3) oppor-
tunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and docu-
mentary evidence; (4) the right to confront and cross-examine
adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds
good cause for not allowing confrontation); (5) a neutral and
detached hearing body such as a traditional parole board, mem-
bers of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (6)
a written statement by the fact finders as to the evidence relied
on and reasons for revoking parole.
Although the Morrissey case deals with revocation of parole,
the same loss occurs when probation is revoked, and due process
protections would therefore seem equally applicable. Two court
of appeals cases decided before Morrissey expressly held that
due process rights were applicable at a revocation proceeding.
In Hahn v. Burke,1 1 the court applied a balancing test, con-
cluding that the probationer's loss of freedom outweighed the
burden on the state to provide a limited hearing before revoca-
tion of probation and holding that due process required the
limited hearing. The holding of this case seems to be strength-
ened and expanded by Morrissey.
The Supreme Court in Morrissey expressly pretermitted the
question of whether a parolee is entitled to assistance of counsel
at a parole revocation proceeding. The Seventh Circuit in Scar-
pelli v. Gagnon'0 2 has held that such a right does exist at a
probation revocation proceeding. In reaching this decision the
court stated that "[w]hether assistance of counsel at the revoca-
tion proceeding is essential to fundamental fairness turns on
the function counsel may be expected to perform ... ."-13 The
court found that counsel at the revocation proceeding would
serve the purpose of "direct[ing], amplify[ing], and promot[ing]
the flow of information . . ." which would be "of real signifi-
cance."'1 4 Such a pragmatic approach is in keeping with the
balancing test enunciated in Goldberg v. Kelly.10 5
It can also be argued that the holding in Mempa v. Rhay,'"
101. 430 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1970).
102. 454 F.2d 416 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. granted, 408 U.S. 921 (1972).
103. 454 F.2d at 422.
104 Id.
105. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
106. 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
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logically extended, calls for the availability of counsel at the
revocation proceeding. It is submitted that if, as recognized in
Mempa, there is a right to counsel at the initial sentencing stage,
there should be a corresponding right at the probation revoca-
tion because a revocation, like initial sentencing, determines the
length of imprisonment and is part of the prosecution process.
It should be noted that the Supreme Court has granted cer-
tiorari in the Scarpelli case thus paving the way for a definitive
ruling on this question. The Advisory Committee favors the
approach indicated in Scarpelli by recommending that the pro-
bationer be entitled to counsel at probation revocation proceed-
ings regardless of constitutional requirements.17
Conclusion
This comparison of Louisiana probation laws and the Amer-
ican Bar Association recommendations suggests several areas
which are in need of legislative consideration. It is submitted
that not only do certain procedural changes need to be made,
but new policies and guidelines should be implemented to aid
in the effective application of probation in the correctional
process. By adopting the Standards, these necessary changes
may be accomplished.
Pamela A. Prestridge
LOUISIANA AND CRIMINAL DISCOVERY
In recent years, the subject of discovery in criminal cases
has inspired great interest and much discussion. This is un-
doubtedly due in no small measure to the success of discovery in
civil proceedings. The question is often asked, why should there
be a difference between civil and criminal proceedings with re-
spect to discovery? The varied responses to this question will
be discussed in some detail. Perhaps the best answer is that
given by Justice Traynor of the California supreme court who
characterized the resistance to criminal discovery as founded in
"the force of adrenal reaction against seemingly plausible men-
aces."'
107. ABA STANDARDS, PROBATION 69.
1. Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in CriminaZ Discovery, 39 N.Y.U.L.
Rsv. 228 (1964).
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